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Mastercard Inc

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Mastercard Inc

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2.2.0.25falsefalse12201 - Disclosure - Legal and Regulatory Proceedingstruefalsefalse1falsefalseUSDfalsefalse1/1/2010 - 12/31/2010 USD ($) / shares USD ($) $Duration_1_1_2010_To_12_31_2010http://www.sec.gov/CIK0001141391duration2010-01-01T00:00:002010-12-31T00:00:00Unit13Standardhttp://www.xbrl.org/2003/instancepurexbrli0Unit16Dividehttp://www.xbrl.org/2003/iso4217USDiso4217http://www.xbrl.org/2003/instancesharesxbrli0Unit12Standardhttp://www.xbrl.org/2003/iso4217USDiso42170Unit1Standardhttp://www.xbrl.org/2003/instancesharesxbrli0USDUSD$2true0ma_LegalAndRegulatoryProceedingsAbstract< /ElementName>mafalsenadurationLegal and Regulatory Proceedingsfalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalse1falsefalsefalse00falsefalsefalsefalsefalseOtherxbrli:stringItemTypestringLegal and Regulatory ProceedingsfalsefalseLegal and Regulatory Proceedings3false0ma_LegalRegulatoryProceedingsTextBlockmafalsenadurationLegal Regulatory Proceedings.falsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalsefalseterselabel1falsefalsefalse00<div> Note 22. Legal and Regulatory Proceedings MasterCard is a party to legal and regulatory proceedings with respect to a variety of matters in the ordinary course of business. Some of these proceedings involve complex claims that are subject to substantial uncertainties and unascertainable damages. Therefore, the probability of loss and an estimation of damages are not possible to ascertain at present. While these types of contingencies are generally resolved over long periods of time, the probability of loss or an estimation of damages can change due to discrete or a combination of developments, which could result in a material adverse effect on our results of operations, cash flows or financial condition. Except as discussed below, MasterCard has not established reserves for any of these proceedings. MasterCard has recorded liabilities for certain legal proceedings which have been settled through contractual ag reements. Except as described below, MasterCard does not believe that any legal or regulatory proceedings to which it is a party would have a material impact on its results of operations, financial position, or cash flows. Although MasterCard believes that it has strong defenses for the pending litigations and regulatory proceedings described below, it could in the future incur judgments and/or fines, enter into settlements of claims or be required to change its business practices in ways that could have a material adverse effect on its results of operations, financial position or cash flows. Notwithstanding MasterCard's belief, in the event it were found liable in a large class-action lawsuit or on the basis of a claim entitling the plaintiff to treble damages or under which it were jointly and severally liable, charges it may be required to record could be significant and could materially and adversely affect its results of operations, cash flow and financial condition, or, in certain circumstances, even c ause MasterCard to become insolvent. Moreover, an adverse outcome in a regulatory proceeding could result in fines and/or lead to the filing of civil damage claims and possibly result in damage awards in amounts that could be significant and could materially and adversely affect the Company's results of operations, cash flows and financial condition. Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Private Litigations In October 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed suit against MasterCard International, Visa U.S.A., Inc. and Visa International Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that both MasterCard's and Visa's governance structure and policies violated U.S. federal antitrust laws. First, the DOJ claimed that "dual governance"—the situation where a financial institution has a representative on the Board of Directors of MasterCard or Visa while a portion of its card portfolio is issued under the brand of the other association—was anti-competitive and acted to limit innovation within the payment card industry. Second, the DOJ challenged MasterCard's Competitive Programs Policy ("CPP") and a Visa bylaw provision that prohibited financial institutions participating in the respective associations from issuing competing proprietary payment cards (such as American Express or Discover). The DOJ alleged that MasterCard's CPP and Visa's bylaw provision acted to restrain competition. In October 2001, District Court Judge Barbara Jones issued an opinion upholding the legality and pro-competitive nature of dual governance. However, the judge also held that MasterCard's CPP and the Visa bylaw constituted unlawful restraints of trade under the federal antitrust laws. In November 2001, the judge issued a final judgment that ordered MasterCard to repeal the CPP insofar as it applies to issuers and enjoined MasterCard from enacting or enforcing any bylaw, rule, policy or practice that prohibits its issuers from issuing general purpose credit or debit cards in the United States on any other general purpose card network. The Second Circuit upheld the final judgment and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Shortly after the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, both American Express and Discover Financial Services, Inc. filed complaints against MasterCard and Visa in which they alleged that the implementation and enforcement of MasterCard's CPP and Visa's bylaw provision violated U.S. federal antitrust laws. In June 2008, MasterCard entered into a settlement agreement with American Express to resolve all current litigation between American Express and MasterCard. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, MasterCard is obligated to make twelve quarterly payments of up to $150 million per quarter with the first payment having been made in September 2008. See Note 20 (Obligations under Litigation Settlements) for additional discussion. In October 2008, MasterCard and Visa entered into a settlement agreement with Discover (the "Discov er Settlement"), ending all litigation between the parties for a total of approximately $2.8 billion. The MasterCard share of the settlement, paid to Discover in November 2008, was approximately $863 million. In addition, in connection with the Discover Settlement and pursuant to a separate agreement, Morgan Stanley, Discover's former parent company, paid MasterCard $35 million in November 2008.   In April 2005, a complaint was filed in California state court on behalf of a putative class of consumers under California unfair competition law (Section 17200) and the Cartwright Act (the "Attridge action"). The claims in this action seek to piggyback on the portion of the DOJ antitrust litigation discussed above with regard to the district court's findings concerning MasterCard's CPP and Visa's related bylaw. MasterCard and Visa moved to dismiss the complaint and the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Cartwright Act claims but denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Section 17200 unfair competition claims. MasterCard filed an answer to the complaint in June 2006 and the parties have proceeded with discovery. In September 2009, MasterCard executed a settlement agreement that is subject to court approval in the C alifornia consumer litigations (see "—U.S. Merchant and Consumer Litigations"). The agreement includes a release that the parties believe encompasses the claims asserted in the Attridge action. On August 23, 2010, the court in the California consumer actions executed an order granting final approval to the settlement. The plaintiff from the Attridge action and three other objectors have filed a notice that they intend to appeal the settlement approval order. At this time, it is not possible to determine the outcome of, or estimate the liability related to, the Attridge action and no incremental provision for losses has been provided in connection with it. Currency Conversion Litigations MasterCard International, together with Visa U.S.A., Inc. and Visa International Corp., are defendants in a state court lawsuit in California. The lawsuit alleges that MasterCard and Visa wrongfully imposed an asserted one percent currency conversion "fee" on every credit card transaction by U.S. MasterCard and Visa cardholders involving the purchase of goods or services in a foreign country, and that such alleged "fee" is unlawful. This action, titled Schwartz v. Visa Int'l Corp., et al. (the "Schwartz action"), was brought in the Superior Court of California in February 2000, purportedly on behalf of the general public. MasterCard International, Visa U.S.A., Inc., Visa International Corp., several member banks including Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., Bank of America, N.A. (USA), MBNA, and Citicorp Diners Club Inc. are also defendants i n a number of federal putative class actions that allege, among other things, violations of federal antitrust laws based on the asserted one percent currency conversion "fee." Pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the federal complaints have been consolidated in MDL No. 1409 (the "MDL action") before Judge William H. Pauley III in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. In July 2006, MasterCard and the other defendants in the MDL action entered into agreements settling the MDL action and related matters, as well as the Schwartz matter. Pursuant to the settlement agreements, MasterCard paid approximately $72 million to be used for the defendants' settlement fund to settle the MDL action and approximately $13 million to settle the Schwartz matter. In November 2006, Judge Pauley granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreements, which were subject to both final approval by Judge Pauley and resolution of all appeals. Subsequently in November 2006, the plaintiff in one of the New York state court cases appealed the preliminary approval of the settlement agreement to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In November 2009, Judge Pauley signed a Fin al Judgment and Order of Dismissal granting final approval to the settlement agreements, and subsequently the same plaintiff in the New York state cases filed notice of appeal of final settlement approval in the MDL action. Within the time period for appeal in the MDL action, twelve other such notices of appeal were filed. Subsequently, several plaintiffs have requested to withdraw their appeals. Briefing on the remaining appeals is ongoing. With regard to other state court currency conversion actions, MasterCard has reached agreements in principle with the plaintiffs for a total of approximately $4 million, which has been accrued. Settlement agreements have been executed with plaintiffs in the Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Arizona, New York, Minnesota, Illinois and Missouri actions. At this time, it is not possible to predict with certainty the ultimate resolution of these matters.   U.S. Merchant and Consumer Litigations Commencing in October 1996, several class action suits were brought by a number of U.S. merchants against MasterCard International and Visa U.S.A., Inc. challenging certain aspects of the payment card industry under U.S. federal antitrust law. Those suits were later consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that MasterCard's "Honor All Cards" rule (and a similar Visa rule), which required merchants who accept MasterCard cards to accept for payment every validly presented MasterCard card, constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs claimed that MasterCard and Visa unlawfully tied acceptance of debit cards to acceptance of credit cards. In June 2003, MasterCard International signed a settlement agreement to settle the claims brought by the plaintiffs in this matter, which the Court approved in December 2003. In January 2005, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order affirming the District Court's approval of the settlement agreement thus making it final. In July 2009, MasterCard International entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs to prepay MasterCard International's remaining payment obligations under the settlement agreement at a discount. In August 2009, the court entered a final order approving the prepayment agreement. The agreement became final pursuant to its terms In September 2009 as there were no appeals of the court's approval, and the prepayment was subsequently made in September 2009. In addition, individual or multiple complaints have been brought in nineteen different states and the District of Columbia alleging state unfair competition, consumer protection and common law claims against MasterCard International (and Visa) on behalf of putative classes of consumers. The claims in these actions largely mirror the allegations made in the U.S. merchant lawsuit and assert that merchants, faced with excessive merchant discount fees, have passed these overcharges to consumers in the form of higher prices on goods and services sold. MasterCard has been successful in dismissing cases in seventeen of the jurisdictions as courts have granted MasterCard's motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their complaints. However, there are outstanding cases in New Mexico and California. On June 9, 2010, the co urt issued an order granting MasterCard's motion to dismiss the complaint in the New Mexico action. The plaintiffs have filed a notice of appeal of that decision. With respect to the California state actions, and as discussed above under "Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Private Litigations," in September 2009, the parties to the California state court actions executed a settlement agreement which required a payment by MasterCard of $6 million, subject to approval by the California state court. On August 23, 2010, the court executed an order granting final approval of the settlement, subsequent to which MasterCard made the payment required by the settlement agreement. The plaintiff from the Attridge action described above under "Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Private Litigations" and three other objectors have filed a notice that they intend to appeal the settlement approval order. At this time, it is not possible to determine the outcome of, or, except as indicated above in the California consumer action, estimate the liability related to, the remaining consumer cases and no provision for losses has been provided in connection with them. The consumer class actions are not covered by the terms of the settlement agreement in the U.S. merchant lawsuit. Interchange Litigation and Regulatory Proceedings Interchange fees represent a sharing of payment system costs among the financial institutions participating in a four-party payment card system such as MasterCard's. Typically, interchange fees are paid by the acquirer to the issuer in connection with purchase transactions initiated with the payment system's cards. These fees reimburse the issuer for a portion of the costs incurred by it in providing services which are of benefit to all participants in the system, including acquirers and merchants. MasterCard or its customer financial institutions establish default interchange fees in certain circumstances that apply when there is no other interchange fee arrangement between the issuer and the acquirer. MasterCard establishes a variety of interchange rates depending on such considerations as the location and the type of transaction, and collects the interchange fee on behalf of the institutions entitled to receive it and remits the interchange fee to eligible institutions. As described more fully below, MasterCard's interchange fees are subject to regulatory and/or legal review and/or challenges in a number of jurisdictions. At this time, it is not possible to determine the ultimate resolution of, or estimate the liability related to, any of the interchange proceedings described below. Except as described below, no provision for losses has been provided in connection with them. United States.    In June 2005, a purported class action lawsuit was filed by a group of merchants in the U.S. District Court of Connecticut against MasterCard International Incorporated, Visa U.S.A., Inc., Visa International Service Association and a number of member banks alleging, among other things, that MasterCard's and Visa's purported setting of interchange fees violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. In addition, the complaint alleges MasterCard's and Visa's purported tying and bundling of transaction fees also constitutes a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The suit seeks treble damages in an unspecified amount, attorneys' fees and injunctive relief. Since the filing of this complaint, ther e have been approximately fifty similar complaints (the majority of which are styled as class actions, although a few complaints are on behalf of individual plaintiffs) filed on behalf of merchants against MasterCard and Visa (and in some cases, certain member banks) in federal courts in California, New York, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Kentucky and Connecticut. In October 2005, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued an order transferring these cases to Judge Gleeson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York for coordination of pre-trial proceedings in MDL No. 1720. In April 2006, the group of purported class plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint. Taken together, the claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint and in the complaints brought on the behalf of the individual merchants are generally brought under both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize a particular industry. Specifically, the complaints contain some or all of the following claims: (1) that MasterCard's and Visa's setting of interchange fees (for both credit and off-line debit transactions) violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act; (2) that MasterCard and Visa have enacted and enforced various rules, including the no surcharge rule and purported anti-steering rules, in violation of Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act; (3) that MasterCard's and Visa's purported bundling of the acceptance of premium credit cards to standard credit cards constitutes an unlawful tying arrangement; and (4) that MasterCard and Visa have unlawfully tied and bundled transaction fees. In addition to the claims brought under federal antitrust law, some of these complaints contain certain unfair competition law claims under state law based upon the same conduct described above. These interchange-related litigations seek treble damages, as well as attorneys' fees and injunctive relief. In June 2006, MasterCard answered the complaint and moved to dismiss or, alternatively, moved to strike the pre-2004 damage claims that were contained in the First Amended Class Action Complaint and moved to dismiss the Section 2 claims that were brought in the individual merchant complaints. In January 2008, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' pre-2004 damage claims. In May 2008, the court denied MasterCard's motion to dismiss the Section 2 monopolization claims. Fact discovery has been proceeding and was generally completed by November 2008. Briefs have been submitted on plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court heard oral argument on the plaintiffs' class certification motion in November 2009. The parties are awaiting a decision on the motion. In January 2009, the class plaintiffs filed a Second Consolidated Class Action Complaint. The allegations and claims in this complaint generally mirror those in the first amended class action complaint described above although plaintiffs have added additional claims brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against MasterCard, Visa and a number of banks alleging, among other things, that the networks and banks have continued to fix interchange fees following each network's initial public offering. In March 2009, MasterCard and the other defendants in the action filed a motion to dismiss the Second Consolidated Class Action Complaint in its entirety, or alternatively, to narrow the claims in the complaint. The parties have fully briefed the motion and the court heard oral argument on the motion in November 2009. The parties are awaiting decisions on the motions . In July 2006, the group of purported class plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint alleging that MasterCard's initial public offering of its Class A Common Stock in May 2006 (the "IPO") and certain purported agreements entered into between MasterCard and its member financial institutions in connection with the IPO: (1) violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act because their effect allegedly may be to substantially lessen competition, (2) violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act because they allegedly constitute an unlawful combination in restraint of trade and (3) constitute a fraudulent conveyance because the member banks are allegedly attempting to release without adequate consideration from the member banks MasterCard's right to assess the member banks for MasterCard's litigation liabilities in these interchange-relate d litigations and in other antitrust litigations pending against it. The plaintiffs seek unspecified damages and an order reversing and unwinding the IPO. In September 2006, MasterCard moved to dismiss all of the claims contained in the supplemental complaint. In November 2008, the district court granted MasterCard's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' supplemental complaint in its entirety with leave to file an amended complaint. In January 2009, the class plaintiffs repled their complaint directed at MasterCard's IPO by filing a First Amended Supplemental Class Action Complaint. The causes of action in the complaint generally mirror those in the plaintiffs' original IPO-related complaint although the plaintiffs have attempted to expand their factual allegations based upon discovery that has been garnered in the case. The class plaintiffs seek treble damages and injunctive relief including, but not limited to, an order reversing and unwinding the IPO. In March 2009, MasterCard filed a motion to dismiss the Fi rst Amended Supplemental Class Action Complaint in its entirety. The parties have fully briefed the motion to dismiss and the court heard oral argument on the motion in November 2009. The parties are awaiting a decision on the motion. In July 2009, the class plaintiffs and individual plaintiffs served confidential expert reports detailing the plaintiffs' theories of liability and alleging damages in the tens of billions of dollars. The defendants served their expert reports in December 2009 countering the plaintiffs' assertions of liability and damages. In February 2011, both the defendants and the plaintiffs served a number of dispositive motions seeking summary judgment on all or portions of the claims in the complaints. Briefing on these motions is scheduled to be completed in June 2011. No trial date has been scheduled, however, the court has asked the parties to consider a trial date of September 12, 2012. The parties have also entered into court-recommended mediation and anticipate scheduling a number of mediation sessions in the coming months. It is not possible to predict whether the mediation will be successful or not. On February 7, 2011, MasterCard and MasterCard International Incorporated entered into each of: (1) an omnibus judgment sharing and settlement sharing agreement with Visa Inc., Visa U.S.A. Inc. and Visa International Service Association and a number of member banks; and (2) a MasterCard settlement and judgment sharing agreement with a number of member banks. The agreements provide for the apportionment of certain costs and liabilities which MasterCard, the Visa parties and the member banks may incur, jointly and/or severally, in the event of an adverse judgment or settlement of one or all of the cases in the interchange merchant litigations. Among a number of scenarios addressed by the agreements, in the event of a global settlement involving the Visa parties, the member banks and MasterCard, MasterCard would pay 12% of the monetar y portion of the settlement. In the event of a settlement involving only MasterCard and the member banks with respect to their issuance of MasterCard cards, MasterCard would pay 36% of the monetary portion of such settlement. In October 2008, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ issued a civil investigative demand to MasterCard and other payment industry participants seeking information regarding certain rules relating to merchant point of acceptance rules. Subsequently, MasterCard received requests for similar information from ten State Attorneys General. On October 1, 2010, MasterCard, the DOJ and seven of the State Attorneys General executed a stipulation and proposed final judgment, subject to court review and approval, pursuant to which MasterCard agreed to make certain modifications to its rules to conform to MasterCard's existing business practices, and therefore to specify, among other things, the ways in which merchants may steer customers to preferred payment forms. The proposed settlement would resolve the DOJ's investigation, and all ten State Attorneys General have close d their investigations of MasterCard. The parties are currently awaiting court approval of the settlement. European Union.    In September 2003, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections challenging MasterCard Europe's cross-border default interchange fees. In June 2006, the European Commission issued a supplemental Statement of Objections covering credit, debit and commercial card fees. In November 2006, the European Commission held hearings on MasterCard Europe's cross-border default interchange fees. In March 2007, the European Commission issued a Letter of Facts, also covering credit, debit and commercial card fees and discussing its views on the impact of the IPO on the case. MasterCard Europe responded to the Statements of Objections and Letter of Facts and made presentations on a variety of issues at the hearings. The European Commission announced its decision in December 2007. The decision applies to MasterCard's default cross-border interchange fees for MasterCard and Maestro branded consumer payment card transactions in the European Economic Area ("EEA") (the European Commission refers to these as "MasterCard's MIF"), but not to commercial card transactions (the European Commission stated publicly that it has not yet finished its investigation of commercial card interchange fees). The decision applies to MasterCard's MIF for cross-border consumer card payments and to any domestic consumer card transactions that default to MasterCard's MIF, of which currently there are none. The decision required MasterCard to stop applying the MasterCard MIF, to refrain from repeating the conduct, and not apply its then recently adopted (but never implemented) Maestro SEPA and Intra-Eurozone default interchange fees to debit card payment transactions within the Eurozone. MasterCard understood that the decision gave MasterCard until June 21, 2008 to comply, with the possibility that the European Commission could have extended this time at its discretion. The decision also required MasterCard to issue certain specific notices to financial institutions and other entities that participate in its MasterCard and Maestro payment systems in the EEA and make certain specific public announcements regarding the steps it has taken to comply. The decision did not impose a fine on MasterCard, but provides for a daily penalty of up to 3.5% of MasterCard's daily consolidated global turnover in the preceding business year (which MasterCard estimates to be approximately $0.5 million U.S. per day ) in the event that MasterCard fails to comply. In March 2008, MasterCard filed an application for annulment of the Eu ropean Commission's decision with the General Court of the European Union. The December 2007 decision against MasterCard permits MasterCard to establish other default cross-border interchange fees for MasterCard and Maestro branded consumer payment card transactions in the EEA if MasterCard can demonstrate by empirical proof to the European Commission's satisfaction that the new interchange fees create efficiencies that outweigh the restriction of competition alleged by the European Commission, that consumers get a fair share of the benefits of the new interchange fees, that there are no less restrictive means of achieving the efficiencies of MasterCard's payment systems, and that competition is not eliminated altogether. In March 2008, MasterCard entered into discussions with the European Commission about, among other things, the nature of the empirical proof it would require for MasterCard to establish other default cross-border interchang e fees consistent with the decision and so as to understand more fully the European Commission's position as to how it may comply with the decision. MasterCard requested an extension of time to comply with the decision and, in April 2008, the European Commission informed MasterCard that it had rejected such request. In June 2008, MasterCard announced that, effective June 21, 2008, MasterCard would temporarily repeal its then current default intra-EEA cross-border consumer card interchange fees in conformity with the decision. In October 2008, MasterCard received an information request from the European Commission in connection with the decision concerning certain pricing changes that MasterCard implemented as of October 1, 2008. MasterCard submitted its response in November 2008. In March 2009, MasterCard gave certain undertakings to the European Commission and, in response, in April 2009, the Commissioner for competition policy and DG Competition informed MasterCard that, subject to MasterCard's fulfilling its undertakings, they do not intend to pursue proceedings for non-compliance with or circumvention of the decision of December 2007 or for infringing the antitrust laws in relation to the October 2008 pricing changes, the introduction of new cross-border consumer default interchange fees or any of the other MasterCard undertakings. MasterCard's undertakings include: (1) repealing the October 2008 pricing changes; (2) adopting a specific methodology for the setting of cross-border consumer default interchange fees; (3) establishing new default cross-border consumer interchange fees as of July 1, 2009 such that the weighted average interchange fee for credit card transactions does not exceed 30 basis points and for debit card transactions does not exceed 20 basis points; (4) introducing a new rule prohibiting its acquirers from requiring merchants to process all of their MasterCard and Maestro transactions with the acquirer; and (5) introducing a new rule requiring its acquirers to provide merchants with certain pricing information in connection with MasterCard and Maestro transactions. The undertakings will be effective until a final decision by the General Court of the European Union regarding MasterCard's application for annulment of the European Commission's December 2007 decision. Although MasterCard believes that any other business practices it would implement in response to the decision would be in compliance with the December 2007 decision, the European Commission may deem any such practice not in compliance with the decision, or in violation of European competition law, in which case MasterCard may be assessed fines for the period that it is not in compliance. Furthermore, because a balancing mechanism like default cross-border interchange fees constitutes an essential element of MasterCard Europe's operations, the December 2007 decision could also significantly impact MasterCard International's European customers' and MasterCard Europe's business. The European Commission decision could also lead to additional competition authorities in European Union member states commencing investigations or proceedings regarding domestic interchange fees or, in certain jurisdictions, regulation. In addition, the European Commission's decision could lead to the filing of private actions against MasterCard Europe by merchants and/or consumers which, if MasterCard is unsuccessful in its application for annulment of the decision, could result in MasterCard owing substantial damages. United Kingdom.    In September 2001, the Office of Fair Trading of the United Kingdom ("OFT") issued a Rule 14 Notice under the U.K. Competition Act 1998 challenging the MasterCard default interchange fees and multilateral service fee ("MSF"), the fee paid by issuers to acquirers when a customer uses a MasterCard-branded card in the United Kingdom either at an ATM or over the counter to obtain a cash advance. Until November 2004, the interchange fees and MSF were established by MasterCard U.K. Members Forum Limited ("MMF") (formerly MasterCard Europay U.K. Ltd.) for domestic credit card transactions in the United Kingdom. The notice contained preliminary conclusions to the effect that the MasterCard U.K. default interchange fees and MSF infringed U.K. competition law and did not qualify for an exemption in their present forms. In February 2003, the OFT issued a supplemental Rule 14 Notice, which also contained preliminary conclusions challenging MasterCard's U.K. interchange fees (but not the MSF) under the Competition Act. In November 2004, the OFT issued a third notice (now called a Statement of Objections) claiming that the interchange fees infringed U.K. and European Union competition law. Subsequently in November 2004, MasterCard's board of directors adopted a resolution withdrawing the authority of the U.K. members to set domestic MasterCard interchange fees and MSFs and conferring such authority on MasterCard's President and Chief Executive Officer. In September 2005, the OFT issued its decision, concluding that MasterCard's U.K. interchange fees that were established by MMF prior to November 18, 2004 contravene U.K. and European Union competition law. The OFT decided not to impose penalties on MasterCard or MMF. MMF and MasterCard appealed the OFT's decision to the U.K. Competition Appeals Tribunal. In June 2006, the U.K. Competition Appeals Tribunal set aside the OFT's decision, following the OFT's request to the Tribunal to withdraw the decision and end its case against MasterCard's U.K. default interchange fees in place prior to November 18, 2004.   Shortly thereafter, the OFT commenced a new investigation of MasterCard's current U.K. default credit card interchange fees and announced in February 2007 that the investigation would also cover so-called "immediate debit" cards. To date, the OFT has issued a number of requests for information to MasterCard Europe and financial institutions that participate in MasterCard's payment system in the United Kingdom. MasterCard understands that the OFT is considering whether to commence a formal proceeding through the issuance of a Statement of Objections. The OFT has informed MasterCard that it does not intend to issue such a Statement of Objections prior to the judgment of the General Court of the European Union with respect to MasterCard's appeal of the December 2007 cross-border interchange fee decision of the European Commission. If the OFT ultimately determines that an y of MasterCard's U.K. interchange fees contravene U.K. and European Union competition law, it may issue a new decision and possibly levy fines accruing from the date of its first decision. MasterCard would likely appeal a negative decision by the OFT in any future proceeding to the Competition Appeals Tribunal. Such an OFT decision could lead to the filing of private actions against MasterCard by merchants and/or consumers which, if its appeal of such an OFT decision were to fail, could result in an award or awards of substantial damages and could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard International's U.K. customers and MasterCard's overall business in the U.K. Poland.    In April 2001, in response to merchant complaints, the Polish Office for Protection of Competition and Consumers (the "PCA") initiated an investigation of MasterCard's domestic credit and debit card default interchange fees. MasterCard Europe filed several submissions and met with the PCA in connection with the investigation. In January 2007, the PCA issued a decision that MasterCard's interchange fees are unlawful under Polish competition law, and imposed fines on MasterCard's licensed financial institutions. As part of this decision, the PCA also decided that MasterCard had not violated the law. MasterCard and the financial institutions appealed the decision to the court of first instance. In November 2008, the court of first instance reversed the decision of the PCA and also rejected MasterCard's app eal on the basis that MasterCard did not have a legal interest in the PCA's decision because its conduct was not found to be in breach of the relevant competition laws. MasterCard has appealed this part of the court of first instance's decision because it has significant interest in the outcome of the case. The PCA appealed the other parts of the decision. On April 22, 2010, the court of appeals issued an oral decision (followed by a written decision on May 25, 2010) in which it reinstated MasterCard's appeal, reversed a specific finding of the court of first instance and sent the case back to the court of first instance for further proceedings. If on appeal the PCA's decision is ultimately allowed to stand, it could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard's Polish customers and on MasterCard's overall business in Poland. Hungary.    In January 2008, the Hungarian Competition Authority ("HCA") notified MasterCard that it had commenced a formal investigation of MasterCard Europe's domestic interchange fees. This followed an informal investigation that the HCA had been conducting since the middle of 2007. In July 2009, the HCA issued to MasterCard a Preliminary Position that MasterCard Europe's historic domestic interchange fees violate Hungarian competition law. MasterCard responded to the Preliminary Position both in writing and at a hearing which was held in September 2009. Subsequently in September 2009, the HCA ruled that MasterCard's historic interchange fees violated the law and fined MasterCard Europe approximately $3 million, which was paid during the fourth quarter of 2009. In December 2 009, the HCA issued its formal decision and MasterCard appealed the decision to the Hungarian courts. On September 24, 2010, the HCA filed its reply to MasterCard's appeal, while MasterCard filed its response in October 2010. On October 29, 2010, the Hungarian appeals court stayed the proceeding until MasterCard's appeal to the General Court of the European Union of the European Commission's December 2007 cross-border interchange fee decision is finally decided. If the HCA's decision is not reversed on appeal, it could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard's Hungarian customers and on MasterCard's overall business in Hungary. Italy.    In July 2009, the Italian Competition Authority ("ICA") commenced a proceeding against MasterCard and a number of its customers concerning MasterCard Europe's domestic interchange fees in Italy. MasterCard, as well as each of the banks involved in the proceeding, offered to give certain undertakings to the ICA, which were rejected (which rejection MasterCard appealed to the Administrative Court). On May 28, 2010, the ICA issued a Statement of Objections to MasterCard and the banks. On November 3, 2010, the ICA adopted a decision in which it determined that MasterCard Europe's domestic interchange fees violate European Union competition law, fined MasterCard €2.7 million and ordered MasterCard to refrain in the future from maintainin g interchange fees that are not based on economic justifications linked to efficiency criteria and to eliminate any anticompetitive clauses from its licensing agreements. MasterCard has appealed the ICA's interchange fee decision to the Administrative Court. On November 16, 2010, the Administrative Court announced its judgment that the ICA had improperly rejected MasterCard's proposed undertakings and annulled the ICA's rejection decision (which decision the ICA has appealed to the Council of State). If the Administrative Court's judgment is overturned and the ICA's interchange fee decision is not reversed on appeal, the ICA's decision could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard's Italian customers and on MasterCard's overall business in Italy. Canada.    On December 15, 2010, the Canadian Competition Bureau (the "CCB") filed an application with the Canadian Competition Tribunal to strike down MasterCard rules related to interchange fees, including the "honor all cards" and "no surcharge" rules. Also in December 2010, MasterCard learned that a purported class action lawsuit had been commenced against it in Quebec on behalf of Canadian merchants and consumers. The suit essentially repeats the allegations and arguments of the CCB application to the Canadian Competition Tribunal and seeks compensatory and punitive damages in unspecified amounts, as well as injunctive relief. If the CCB's challenges and/or the class action law suit were ultimately successful, such negative decisions could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCa rd's Canadian customers and on MasterCard's overall business in Canada. Australia.    In 2002, the Reserve Bank of Australia ("RBA") announced regulations under the Payments Systems (Regulation) Act of 1998 applicable to four-party credit card payment systems in Australia, including MasterCard's. Those regulations, among other things, mandate the use of a formula for determining domestic interchange fees that effectively caps their weighted average at 50 basis points. Operators of three-party systems, such as American Express and Diners Club, were unaffected by the interchange fee regulation. In 2007, the RBA commenced a review of such regulations and, in September 2008, the RBA released its final conclusions. These indicated that the RBA was willing to withdraw its regulations if MasterCard and Visa made certain undertakings regarding the future levels of their respective credit card interchange fees and other practices, including their "honor all cards" rules. If the undertakings were not made, the RBA said it would consider imposing in 2009 additional regulations that could further reduce the domestic interchange fees of MasterCard and Visa in Australia. In August 2009, the RBA announced that it had decided not to withdraw its regulations and that it would maintain them in their current form pending further consideration of the regulations. MasterCard plans to continue discussions with the RBA as to the nature of the undertakings that MasterCard may be willing to provide. The effect of the undertakings or any such additional regulations could put MasterCard at an even greater competitive disadvantage relative to competitors in Australia that purportedly do not operate four-party systems or, in the case of the undertakings, possibly increase MasterCard's legal exposure under Australian competition laws, which could have a significant adverse impact on MasterCard's business in Australia . South Africa.    In August 2006, the South Africa Competition Commission created a special body, the Jali Enquiry (the "Enquiry"), to examine competition in the payments industry in South Africa, including interchange fees. After nearly two years of investigation, including several rounds of public hearings in which MasterCard participated, in June 2008, the Enquiry published an Executive Summary of its findings. The Enquiry's full report was made public in December 2008. The Enquiry recommends, among other things, that an independent authority be established to set payment card interchange fees in South Africa and that payment systems' (including MasterCard's) respective "honor all cards" rules be modified to give merchants greater freedom to choose which types of cards to accept. Following the issuance of the En quiry's report, the South African Reserve Bank ("SARB"), the South African Treasury and the South African Competition Commission informed MasterCard that they were actively considering what, if any, action they would take in response to the Enquiry's recommendations. In September 2010, the SARB informed MasterCard that it intended to appoint an independent consultant to make a recommendation on a simplified interchange structure for all payment systems in South Africa, including MasterCard's. Such an interchange structure, if adopted, could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard's South African customers and on MasterCard's overall business in South Africa. Other Jurisdictions.    In January 2006, a German retailers association filed a complaint with the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO") in Germany concerning MasterCard's domestic default interchange fees. The complaint alleges that MasterCard's German domestic interchange fees are not transparent to merchants and include so-called "extraneous costs". In December 2009, the FCO sent MasterCard a questionnaire concerning its domestic interchange fees. MasterCard is aware that regulatory authorities and/or central banks in certain other jurisdictions including Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Israel, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Turkey and Venezuela are reviewing MasterCard's and/or its members' interchange fees and/or related practices (such as the "honor all cards" rule) and may seek to regulate the establishment of such fees and/or such practices. Other Regulatory Proceedings In addition to challenges to interchange fees, MasterCard's standards and operations are also subject to regulatory and/or legal review and/or challenges in a number of jurisdictions. At this time, it is not possible to determine the ultimate resolution of, or estimate the liability related to, any of the proceedings described below. Except as described below, no provision for losses has been provided in connection with them. Switzerland. On July 2, 2010, MasterCard received a notice from the Swiss Competition Authority ("WEKO") that, based upon complaints, WEKO had opened an investigation of MasterCard's domestic debit acquirer fees to determine whether to order MasterCard to discontinue charging the fees. In July 2010, MasterCard responded to the notice and filed additional comments. On September 1, 2010, the WEKO issued a decision in which it rejected the complaints and declined to open proceedings on the matter. Ukraine. On June 5, 2010, the Ukrainian Competition Authority (the "UCA") issued MasterCard a comprehensive information request concerning its rules and domestic fees in response to a complaint filed by a Ukrainian banking association. MasterCard is cooperating with the UCA's investigation. Netherlands. On February 11, 2011, the Netherlands Competition Authority issued MasterCard a Statement of Objections challenging MasterCard co-branding and co-residency rules and policies. The co-branding rules being challenged prohibit, in some cases, financial institutions licensed by MasterCard from placing other payment systems' brands on MasterCard cards. The co-residency rules being challenged prohibit, in some cases, licensed financial institutions from encoding other payment systems' applications on the electronic "chip" in MasterCard cards. MasterCard's response to the Statement of Objection is due by March 11, 2011. </div>Note 22. Legal and Regulatory Proceedings MasterCard is a party to legal and regulatory proceedings with respect to a variety of matters in the ordinaryfalsefalsefalsefalsefalseOtherus-types:textBlockItemTypestringLegal Regulatory Proceedings.No authoritative reference available.falsefalseLegal and Regulatory Proceedings12Legal and Regulatory ProceedingsUnKnownUnKnownUnKnownUnKnownfalsetrue