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1.0.0.3 false Legal and Regulatory Proceedings false 1 $ false false iso4217_USD Standard http://www.xbrl.org/2003/iso4217 USD iso4217 0 iso4217_USD_per_shares Divide http://www.xbrl.org/2003/iso4217 USD iso4217 http://www.xbrl.org/2003/instance shares 0 shares Standard http://www.xbrl.org/2003/instance shares 0 5 Legal and Regulatory Proceedings 3 ma_LegalRegulatoryProceedingsTextBlock ma false na duration string Legal Regulatory Proceedings [Text Block] false false false false false false false false false 1 false false 0 0 <div> Note 21. Legal and Regulatory Proceedings MasterCard is a party to legal and regulatory proceedings with respect to a variety of matters in the ordinary course of business. Some of these proceedings involve complex claims that are subject to substantial uncertainties and unascertainable damages. Therefore, the probability of loss and an estimation of damages are not possible to ascertain at present. Accordingly, except as discussed below, MasterCard has not established reserves for any of these proceedings. MasterCard has recorded liabilities for certain legal proceedings which have been settled through contractual agreements. Except as described below, MasterCard does not believe that any legal or regulatory proceedings to which it is a party would have a material impact on its results of operations, financial position, or cash flows. Although MasterCard believes that it has strong defenses for the litigations and regulatory proceedings described below, it could in the future incur judgments and/or fines, enter into settlements of claims or be required to change its business practices in ways that could have a material adverse effect on its results of operations, financial position or cash flows. Notwithstanding MasterCard’s belief, in the event it were found liable in a large class-action lawsuit or on the basis of a claim entitling the plaintiff to treble damages or under which it were jointly and severally liable, charges it may be required to record could be significant and could materially and adversely affect its results of operations, cash flow and financial condition, or, in certain circumstances, even cause MasterCard to become insolvent. Moreover, an adverse outcome in a regulatory proceeding could result in fines and/or lead to the filing of civil damage claims and possibly result in damage awards in amounts that could be significant and could materially and adversely affect the Company’s results of operations, cash flows and financial condition. Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Private Litigations In October 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed suit against MasterCard International, Visa U.S.A., Inc. and Visa International Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that both MasterCard’s and Visa’s governance structure and policies violated U.S. federal antitrust laws. First, the DOJ claimed that “dual governance”—the situation where a financial institution has a representative on the Board of Directors of MasterCard or Visa while a portion of its card portfolio is issued under the brand of the other association—was anti-competitive and acted to limit innovation within the payment card industry. Second, the DOJ challenged MasterCard’s Competitive Programs Policy (“CPP”) and a Visa bylaw provision that prohibited financial institutions participating in the respective associations from issuing competing proprietary payment cards (such as American Express or Discover). The DOJ alleged that MasterCard’s CPP and Visa’s bylaw provision acted to restrain competition. On October 9, 2001, District Court Judge Barbara Jones issued an opinion upholding the legality and pro-competitive nature of dual governance. However, the judge also held that MasterCard’s CPP and the Visa bylaw constituted unlawful restraints of trade under the federal antitrust laws. On November 26, 2001, the judge issued a final judgment that ordered MasterCard to repeal the CPP insofar as it applies to issuers and enjoined MasterCard from enacting or enforcing any bylaw, rule, policy or practice that prohibits its issuers from issuing general purpose credit or debit cards in the United States on any other general purpose card network. The Second Circuit upheld the final judgment and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Shortly after the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, both American Express and Discover Financial Services, Inc. filed complaints against MasterCard and Visa in which they alleged that the implementation and enforcement of MasterCard’s CPP and Visa’s bylaw provision violated both Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts or conspiracy to monopolize a particular market. These actions were designated as related cases to the DOJ litigation. On June 24, 2008, MasterCard entered into a settlement agreement with American Express to resolve all current litigation between American Express and MasterCard. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, MasterCard is obligated to make twelve quarterly payments of up to $150,000 per quarter with the first payment having been made in September 2008. See Note 19 (Obligations under Litigation Settlements) for additional discussion. On October 27, 2008, MasterCard and Visa entered into a settlement agreement with Discover, ending all litigation between the parties for a total of $2,750,000. The MasterCard share of the settlement, paid to Discover in November 2008, was $862,500. In addition, in connection with the Discover Settlement and pursuant to a separate agreement, Morgan Stanley, Discover’s former parent company, paid MasterCard $35,000 in November 2008. On April 29, 2005, a complaint was filed in California state court on behalf of a putative class of consumers under California unfair competition law (Section 17200) and the Cartwright Act (the “Attridge action”). The claims in this action seek to piggyback on the portion of the DOJ antitrust litigation discussed above with regard to the district court’s findings concerning MasterCard’s CPP and Visa’s related bylaw. MasterCard and Visa moved to dismiss the complaint and the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Cartwright Act claims but denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Section 17200 unfair competition claims. MasterCard filed an answer to the complaint on June 19, 2006 and the parties have proceeded with discovery. On September 14, 2009, MasterCard executed a settlement agreement that is subject to court approval in the California consumer litigations (see “—U.S. Merchant and Consumer Litigations”). The agreement includes a release that the parties believe encompasses the claims asserted in the Attridge action. On January 5, 2010, the court in the California consumer actions executed an order preliminarily approving the settlement, overruling objections by the plaintiff in the Attridge case. A hearing on final approval of the settlement is set for July 16, 2010. At this time, it is not possible to determine the outcome of, or estimate the liability related to, the Attridge action and no incremental provision for losses has been provided in connection with it. Currency Conversion Litigations MasterCard International, together with Visa U.S.A., Inc. and Visa International Corp., are defendants in a state court lawsuit in California. The lawsuit alleges that MasterCard and Visa wrongfully imposed an asserted one percent currency conversion “fee” on every credit card transaction by U.S. MasterCard and Visa cardholders involving the purchase of goods or services in a foreign country, and that such alleged “fee” is unlawful. This action, titled Schwartz v. Visa Int’l Corp., et al. (the “Schwartz action”), was brought in the Superior Court of California in February 2000, purportedly on behalf of the general public. Trial of the Schwartz action commenced on May 20, 2002 and concluded on November 27, 2002. The Schwartz action claims that the alleged “fee” grossly exceeds any costs the defendants might incur in connection with currency conversions relating to credit card purchase transactions made in foreign countries and is not properly disclosed to cardholders. MasterCard denies these allegations.   On April 8, 2003, the trial court judge issued a final decision in the Schwartz matter. In his decision, the trial judge found that MasterCard’s currency conversion process does not violate the Truth in Lending Act or regulations, nor is it unconscionably priced under California law. However, the judge found that the practice is deceptive under California law, and ordered that MasterCard mandate that members disclose the currency conversion process to cardholders in cardholder agreements, applications, solicitations and monthly billing statements. As to MasterCard, the judge also ordered restitution to California cardholders. The judge issued a decision on restitution on September 19, 2003, which requires a traditional notice and claims process in which consumers have approximately nine months to submit their claims. The court issued its final judgment on October 31, 2003. On December 29, 2003, MasterCard appealed the judgment. The final judgment and restitution process were stayed pending MasterCard’s appeal. On August 6, 2004, the court awarded plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $28,224 to be paid equally by MasterCard and Visa. Accordingly, during the three months ended September 30, 2004, MasterCard accrued amounts totaling $14,112. MasterCard subsequently filed a notice of appeal on the attorneys’ fee award on October 1, 2004. With respect to restitution, MasterCard believed that it was likely to prevail on appeal. In February 2005, MasterCard filed an appeal regarding the applicability of Proposition 64, which amended sections 17203 and 17204 of the California Business and Professions Code, to this action. On September 28, 2005, the appellate court reversed the trial court, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue the action in light of Proposition 64. On May 8, 2007, the trial court dismissed the case. MasterCard International, Visa U.S.A., Inc., Visa International Corp., several member banks including Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A., Bank of America, N.A. (USA), MBNA, and Citicorp Diners Club Inc. are also defendants in a number of federal putative class actions that allege, among other things, violations of federal antitrust laws based on the asserted one percent currency conversion “fee.” Pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the federal complaints have been consolidated in MDL No. 1409 before Judge William H. Pauley III in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. In January 2002, the federal plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Amended Complaint (“MDL Complaint”) adding MBNA Corporation and MBNA America Bank, N.A. as defendants. This pleading asserts two theories of antitrust conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: (i) an alleged “inter-association” conspiracy among MasterCard (together with its members), Visa (together with its members) and Diners Club to fix currency conversion “fees” allegedly charged to cardholders of “no less than 1% of the transaction amount and frequently more”; and (ii) two alleged “intra-association” conspiracies, whereby each of Visa and MasterCard is claimed separately to have conspired with its members to fix currency conversion “fees” allegedly charged to cardholders of “no less than 1% of the transaction amount” and “to facilitate and encourage institution—and collection—of second tier currency conversion surcharges.” The MDL Complaint also asserts that the alleged currency conversion “fees” have not been disclosed as required by the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. On July 20, 2006, MasterCard and the other defendants in the MDL action entered into agreements settling the MDL action and related matters, as well as the Schwartz matter. Pursuant to the settlement agreements, MasterCard paid $72,480 to be used for the defendants’ settlement fund to settle the MDL action and $13,440 to settle the Schwartz matter. On November 8, 2006, Judge Pauley granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreements, which were subject to both final approval by Judge Pauley and resolution of all appeals. On November 15, 2006, the plaintiff in one of the New York state court cases appealed the preliminary approval of the settlement agreement to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On November 3, 2009, Judge Pauley signed a Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal granting final approval to the settlement agreements. On November 20, 2009, the same plaintiff in the New York state cases filed notice of appeal of final settlement approval in the MDL action. Within the time period for appeal in the MDL action, twelve other such notices of appeal were filed. With regard to other state court currency conversion actions, MasterCard has reached agreements in principle with the plaintiffs for a total of $3,557, which has been accrued. Settlement agreements have been executed with plaintiffs in the Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Arkansas, Tennessee, Arizona, New York, Minnesota, Illinois and Missouri actions. At this time, it is not possible to predict with certainty the ultimate resolution of these matters. U.S. Merchant and Consumer Litigations Commencing in October 1996, several class action suits were brought by a number of U.S. merchants against MasterCard International and Visa U.S.A., Inc. challenging certain aspects of the payment card industry under U.S. federal antitrust law. Those suits were later consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that MasterCard’s “Honor All Cards” rule (and a similar Visa rule), which required merchants who accept MasterCard cards to accept for payment every validly presented MasterCard card, constituted an illegal tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs claimed that MasterCard and Visa unlawfully tied acceptance of debit cards to acceptance of credit cards. On June 4, 2003, MasterCard International signed a settlement agreement to settle the claims brought by the plaintiffs in this matter, which the Court approved on December 19, 2003. On January 24, 2005, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order affirming the District Court’s approval of the settlement agreement thus making it final. On July 1, 2009, MasterCard International entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs to prepay MasterCard International’s remaining payment obligations under the settlement agreement at a discount. On August 26, 2009, the court entered a final order approving the prepayment agreement. The agreement became final pursuant to its terms on September 25, 2009 as there were no appeals of the court’s approval, and the prepayment was made on September 30, 2009. See Note 19 (Obligations under Litigation Settlements) for additional discussion. In addition, individual or multiple complaints have been brought in 19 different states and the District of Columbia alleging state unfair competition, consumer protection and common law claims against MasterCard International (and Visa) on behalf of putative classes of consumers. The claims in these actions largely mirror the allegations made in the U.S. merchant lawsuit and assert that merchants, faced with excessive merchant discount fees, have passed these overcharges to consumers in the form of higher prices on goods and services sold. MasterCard has been successful in dismissing cases in seventeen of the jurisdictions as courts have granted MasterCard’s motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim or plaintiffs have voluntarily dismissed their complaints. However, there are outstanding cases in New Mexico and California. The parties are awaiting a decision on MasterCard’s motion to dismiss in New Mexico. In December 2008, MasterCard reached an agreement in principle to resolve the California state court actions described above for a payment by MasterCard of $6,000. As discussed above under “Department of Justice Antitrust Litigation and Related Party Litigations,” in connection with the Attridge action, on September 14, 2009, the parties to the California state court actions executed a settlement agreement which the parties believe would resolve the actions, subject to approval by the California state court. On January 5, 2010, the court executed an order preliminarily approving the settlement. A hearing on final approval of the settlement is set for July 16, 2010. At this time, it is not possible to determine the outcome of, or, except as indicated above in the California consumer action, estimate the liability related to, the remaining consumer cases and no provision for losses has been provided in connection with them. The consumer class actions are not covered by the terms of the settlement agreement in the U.S. merchant lawsuit.   Interchange Litigation and Regulatory Proceedings Interchange fees represent a sharing of payment system costs among the financial institutions participating in a four-party payment card system such as MasterCard’s. Typically, interchange fees are paid by the acquirer to the issuer in connection with transactions initiated with the payment system’s cards. These fees reimburse the issuer for a portion of the costs incurred by it in providing services which are of benefit to all participants in the system, including acquirers and merchants. MasterCard or its customer financial institutions establish default interchange fees in certain circumstances that apply when there is no other interchange fee arrangement between the issuer and the acquirer. MasterCard establishes a variety of interchange rates depending on such considerations as the location and the type of transaction, and collects the interchange fee on behalf of the institutions entitled to receive it and remits the interchange fee to eligible institutions. As described more fully below, MasterCard’s interchange fees are subject to regulatory and/or legal review and/or challenges in a number of jurisdictions. At this time, it is not possible to determine the ultimate resolution of, or estimate the liability related to, any of the interchange proceedings described below. Except as described below, no provision for losses has been provided in connection with them. United States.    On June 22, 2005, a purported class action lawsuit was filed by a group of merchants in the U.S. District Court of Connecticut against MasterCard International Incorporated, Visa U.S.A., Inc., Visa International Service Association and a number of member banks alleging, among other things, that MasterCard’s and Visa’s purported setting of interchange fees violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits contracts, combinations and conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade. In addition, the complaint alleges MasterCard’s and Visa’s purported tying and bundling of transaction fees also constitutes a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The suit seeks treble damages in an unspecified amount, attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief. Since the filing of this complaint, there have been approximately fifty similar complaints (the majority styled as class actions although a few complaints are on behalf of individual plaintiffs) filed on behalf of merchants against MasterCard and Visa (and in some cases, certain member banks) in federal courts in California, New York, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Kentucky and Connecticut. On October 19, 2005, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued an order transferring these cases to Judge Gleeson of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York for coordination of pre-trial proceedings in MDL No. 1720. On April 24, 2006, the group of purported class plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint. Taken together, the claims in the First Amended Class Action Complaint and in the complaints brought on the behalf of the individual merchants are generally brought under both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization and attempts or conspiracies to monopolize a particular industry. Specifically, the complaints contain some or all of the following claims: (i) that MasterCard’s and Visa’s setting of interchange fees (for both credit and offline debit transactions) violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act; (ii) that MasterCard and Visa have enacted and enforced various rules, including the no surcharge rule and purported anti-steering rules, in violation of Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act; (iii) that MasterCard’s and Visa’s purported bundling of the acceptance of premium credit cards to standard credit cards constitutes an unlawful tying arrangement; and (iv) that MasterCard and Visa have unlawfully tied and bundled transaction fees. In addition to the claims brought under federal antitrust law, some of these complaints contain certain unfair competition law claims under state law based upon the same conduct described above. These interchange-related litigations seek treble damages, as well as attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief. On June 9, 2006, MasterCard answered the complaint and moved to dismiss or, alternatively, moved to strike the pre-2004 damage claims that were contained in the First Amended Class Action Complaint and moved to dismiss the Section 2 claims that were brought in the individual merchant complaints. On January 8, 2008, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ pre-2004 damage claims. On May 14, 2008, the court denied MasterCard’s motion to dismiss the Section 2 monopolization claims. Fact discovery has been proceeding and was generally completed by November 21, 2008. Briefs have been submitted on plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court heard oral argument on the plaintiffs’ class certification motion on November 19, 2009. The parties are awaiting a decision on the motion.   On January 29, 2009, the class plaintiffs filed a Second Consolidated Class Action Complaint. The allegations and claims in this complaint generally mirror those in the first amended class action complaint described above although plaintiffs have added additional claims brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act against MasterCard, Visa and a number of banks alleging, among other things, that the networks and banks have continued to fix interchange fees following each network’s initial public offering. On March 31, 2009, MasterCard and the other defendants in the action filed a motion to dismiss the Second Consolidated Class Action Complaint in its entirety, or alternatively, to narrow the claims in the complaint. The parties have fully briefed the motion and the court heard oral argument on the motion on November 18, 2009. The parties are awaiting decisions on the motions. On July 5, 2006, the group of purported class plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint alleging that MasterCard’s initial public offering of its Class A Common Stock in May 2006 (the “IPO”) and certain purported agreements entered into between MasterCard and its member financial institutions in connection with the IPO: (1) violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act because their effect allegedly may be to substantially lessen competition, (2) violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act because they allegedly constitute an unlawful combination in restraint of trade and (3) constitute a fraudulent conveyance because the member banks are allegedly attempting to release without adequate consideration from the member banks MasterCard’s right to assess the member banks for MasterCard’s litigation liabilities in these interchange-related litigations and in other antitrust litigations pending against it. The plaintiffs seek unspecified damages and an order reversing and unwinding the IPO. On September 15, 2006, MasterCard moved to dismiss all of the claims contained in the supplemental complaint. On November 25, 2008, the district court granted MasterCard’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ supplemental complaint in its entirety with leave to file an amended complaint. On January 29, 2009, the class plaintiffs repled their complaint directed at MasterCard’s IPO by filing a First Amended Supplemental Class Action Complaint. The causes of action in the complaint generally mirror those in the plaintiffs’ original IPO-related complaint although the plaintiffs have attempted to expand their factual allegations based upon discovery that has been garnered in the case. The class plaintiffs seek treble damages and injunctive relief including, but not limited to, an order reversing and unwinding the IPO. On March 31, 2009, MasterCard filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Supplemental Class Action Complaint in its entirety. The parties have fully briefed the motion to dismiss and the court heard oral argument on the motion on November 18, 2009. The parties are awaiting a decision on the motion. On July 2, 2009, the class plaintiffs and individual plaintiffs served confidential expert reports detailing the plaintiffs’ theories of liability and alleging damages in the tens of billions of dollars. The defendants served their expert reports on December 14, 2009 countering the plaintiffs’ assertions of liability and damages. Briefing on dispositive motions, including summary judgment motions, is currently scheduled to be completed on October 25, 2010. No trial date has been scheduled. The parties have also entered into court-recommended mediation. On October 10, 2008, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ issued a civil investigative demand to MasterCard and other payment industry participants seeking information regarding certain rules relating to merchant point of acceptance rules, particularly with respect to merchants’ ability to steer customers to payment forms preferred by merchants. Subsequently, MasterCard received requests for similar information from certain State Attorneys General, including the Attorneys General of Ohio and Texas. In addition, on December 23, 2009, MasterCard received a request from the Texas Attorney General’s office for MasterCard’s responses to questions concerning both its merchant point of acceptance rules as well as its practices surrounding the setting of default interchange rates. MasterCard is cooperating with the DOJ and the offices of the State Attorneys General in connection with their requests for information. European Union.    In September 2000, the European Commission issued a “Statement of Objections” challenging Visa International’s cross-border default interchange fees under European Community competition rules. On July 24, 2002, the European Commission announced its decision to exempt the Visa interchange fees from these rules through the end of 2007 based on certain changes proposed by Visa to its interchange fees. Among other things, in connection with the exemption order, Visa agreed to adopt a cost-based methodology for calculating its interchange fees similar to the methodology employed by MasterCard, which considers the costs of certain specified services provided by issuers, and to reduce its interchange rates for debit and credit transactions to amounts at or below certain specified levels. On September 25, 2003, the European Commission issued a Statement of Objections challenging MasterCard Europe’s cross-border default interchange fees. On June 23, 2006, the European Commission issued a supplemental Statement of Objections covering credit, debit and commercial card fees. On November 14 and 15, 2006, the European Commission held hearings on MasterCard Europe’s cross-border default interchange fees. On March 23, 2007, the European Commission issued a Letter of Facts, also covering credit, debit and commercial card fees and discussing its views on the impact of the IPO on the case. MasterCard Europe responded to the Statements of Objections and Letter of Facts and made presentations on a variety of issues at the hearings. The European Commission announced its decision on December 19, 2007. The decision applies to MasterCard’s default cross-border interchange fees for MasterCard and Maestro branded consumer payment card transactions in the European Economic Area (“EEA”) (the European Commission refers to these as “MasterCard’s MIF”), but not to commercial card transactions (the European Commission stated publicly that it has not yet finished its investigation of commercial card interchange fees). The decision applies to MasterCard’s MIF for cross-border consumer card payments and to any domestic consumer card transactions that default to MasterCard’s MIF, of which currently there are none. The decision required MasterCard to stop applying the MasterCard MIF, to refrain from repeating the conduct, and not apply its then recently adopted (but never implemented) Maestro SEPA and Intra-Eurozone default interchange fees to debit card payment transactions within the Eurozone. MasterCard understood that the decision gave MasterCard until June 21, 2008 to comply, with the possibility that the European Commission could have extended this time at its discretion. The decision also required MasterCard to issue certain specific notices to financial institutions and other entities that participate in its MasterCard and Maestro payment systems in the EEA and make certain specific public announcements regarding the steps it has taken to comply. The decision did not impose a fine on MasterCard, but provides for a daily penalty of up to 3.5% of MasterCard’s daily consolidated global turnover in the preceding business year (which MasterCard estimates to be approximately $500 U.S. per day) in the event that MasterCard fails to comply. On March 1, 2008, MasterCard filed an application for annulment of the European Commission’s decision with the General Court of the European Union. On March 26, 2008, the European Commission announced that it has opened formal antitrust proceedings against, and on April 6, 2009, the European Commission announced that it had issued a Statement of Objections to, Visa Europe Limited, under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The proceedings are in relation to Visa’s multilateral interchange fees for cross-border and certain domestic consumer payment card transactions within the EEA and Visa’s ‘honor all cards’ rule as it applies to these transactions. The December 19, 2007 decision against MasterCard permits MasterCard to establish other default cross-border interchange fees for MasterCard and Maestro branded consumer payment card transactions in the EEA if MasterCard can demonstrate by empirical proof to the European Commission’s satisfaction that the new interchange fees create efficiencies that outweigh the restriction of competition alleged by the European Commission, that consumers get a fair share of the benefits of the new interchange fees, that there are no less restrictive means of achieving the efficiencies of MasterCard’s payment systems, and that competition is not eliminated altogether. In March 2008, MasterCard entered into discussions with the European Commission about, among other things, the nature of the empirical proof it would require for MasterCard to establish other default cross-border interchange fees consistent with the decision and so as to understand more fully the European Commission’s position as to how it may comply with the decision. MasterCard requested an extension of time to comply with the decision and, on April 26, 2008, the European Commission informed MasterCard that it had rejected such request. On June 12, 2008, MasterCard announced that, effective June 21, 2008, MasterCard would temporarily repeal its then current default intra-EEA cross-border consumer card interchange fees in conformity with the decision. On October 17, 2008, MasterCard received an information request from the European Commission in connection with the decision concerning certain pricing changes that MasterCard implemented as of October 1, 2008. MasterCard submitted its response on November 13, 2008. On March 30, 2009, MasterCard gave certain undertakings to the European Commission and, in response, on April 1, 2009, the Commissioner for competition policy and DG Competition informed MasterCard that, subject to MasterCard’s fulfilling its undertakings, they do not intend to pursue proceedings for non-compliance with or circumvention of the decision of December 19, 2007 or for infringing the antitrust laws in relation to the October 1, 2008 pricing changes, the introduction of new cross-border consumer default interchange fees or any of the other MasterCard undertakings. MasterCard’s undertakings include: (1) repealing the October 1, 2008 pricing changes; (2) adopting a specific methodology for the setting of cross-border consumer default interchange fees; (3) establishing new default cross-border consumer interchange fees as of July 1, 2009 such that the weighted average interchange fee for credit card transactions does not exceed 30 basis points and for debit card transactions does not exceed 20 basis points; (4) introducing a new rule prohibiting its acquirers from requiring merchants to process all of their MasterCard and Maestro transactions with the acquirer; and (5) introducing a new rule requiring its acquirers to provide merchants with certain pricing information in connection with MasterCard and Maestro transactions. The undertakings will be effective until a final decision by the General Court of the European Union regarding MasterCard’s application for annulment of the European Commission’s December 19, 2007 decision. Although MasterCard believes that any other business practices it would implement in response to the decision would be in compliance with the December 19, 2007 decision, the European Commission may deem any such practice not in compliance with the decision, or in violation of European competition law, in which case MasterCard may be assessed fines for the period that it is not in compliance. Furthermore, because a balancing mechanism like default cross-border interchange fees constitutes an essential element of MasterCard Europe’s operations, the December 19, 2007 decision could also significantly impact MasterCard International’s European customers’ and MasterCard Europe’s business. The European Commission decision could also lead to additional competition authorities in European Union member states commencing investigations or proceedings regarding domestic interchange fees or, in certain jurisdictions, regulation. In addition, the European Commission’s decision could lead to the filing of private actions against MasterCard Europe by merchants and/or consumers which, if MasterCard is unsuccessful in its application for annulment of the decision, could result in MasterCard owing substantial damages. United Kingdom Office of Fair Trading.    On September 25, 2001, the Office of Fair Trading of the United Kingdom (“OFT”) issued a Rule 14 Notice under the U.K. Competition Act 1998 challenging the MasterCard default interchange fees and multilateral service fee (“MSF”), the fee paid by issuers to acquirers when a customer uses a MasterCard-branded card in the United Kingdom either at an ATM or over the counter to obtain a cash advance. Until November 2004, the interchange fees and MSF were established by MasterCard U.K. Members Forum Limited (“MMF”) (formerly MasterCard Europay U.K. Ltd.) for domestic credit card transactions in the United Kingdom. The notice contained preliminary conclusions to the effect that the MasterCard U.K. default interchange fees and MSF infringed U.K. competition law and did not qualify for an exemption in their present forms. On February 11, 2003, the OFT issued a supplemental Rule 14 Notice, which also contained preliminary conclusions challenging MasterCard’s U.K. interchange fees (but not the MSF) under the Competition Act. On November 10, 2004, the OFT issued a third notice (now called a Statement of Objections) claiming that the interchange fees infringed U.K. and European Union competition law. On November 18, 2004, MasterCard’s board of directors adopted a resolution withdrawing the authority of the U.K. members to set domestic MasterCard interchange fees and MSFs and conferring such authority exclusively on MasterCard’s President and Chief Executive Officer. On September 6, 2005, the OFT issued its decision, concluding that MasterCard’s U.K. interchange fees that were established by MMF prior to November 18, 2004 contravene U.K. and European Union competition law. The OFT decided not to impose penalties on MasterCard or MMF. MMF and MasterCard appealed the OFT’s decision to the U.K. Competition Appeals Tribunal. On June 19, 2006, the U.K. Competition Appeals Tribunal set aside the OFT’s decision, following the OFT’s request to the Tribunal to withdraw the decision and end its case against MasterCard’s U.K. default interchange fees in place prior to November 18, 2004. Shortly thereafter, the OFT commenced a new investigation of MasterCard’s current U.K. default credit card interchange fees and announced on February 9, 2007 that the investigation would also cover so-called “immediate debit” cards. To date, the OFT has issued a number of requests for information to MasterCard Europe and financial institutions that participate in MasterCard’s payment system in the United Kingdom. MasterCard understands that the OFT is considering whether to commence a formal proceeding through the issuance of a Statement of Objections. The OFT has indicated that it does not intend to issue such a Statement of Objections prior to the judgment of the General Court of the European Union with respect to the December 2007 decision of the European Commission. If the OFT ultimately determines that any of MasterCard’s U.K. interchange fees contravene U.K. and European Union competition law, it may issue a new decision and possibly levy fines accruing from the date of its first decision. MasterCard would likely appeal a negative decision by the OFT in any future proceeding to the Competition Appeals Tribunal. Such an OFT decision could lead to the filing of private actions against MasterCard by merchants and/or consumers which, if its appeal of such an OFT decision were to fail, could result in an award or awards of substantial damages and could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard International’s U.K. customers and MasterCard’s overall business in the U.K. Poland.    In April 2001, in response to merchant complaints, the Polish Office for Protection of Competition and Consumers (the “PCA”) initiated an investigation of MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) domestic credit and debit card default interchange fees. MasterCard Europe filed several submissions and met with the PCA in connection with the investigation. In January 2007, the PCA issued a decision that MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) interchange fees are unlawful under Polish competition law, and imposed fines on MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) licensed financial institutions. As part of this decision, the PCA also decided that MasterCard (and Visa) had not violated the law. MasterCard and the financial institutions appealed the decision. On November 12, 2008, the appeals court reversed the decision of the PCA and also rejected MasterCard’s appeal on the basis that MasterCard did not have a legal interest in the PCA’s decision because its conduct was not found to be in breach of the relevant competition laws. MasterCard has appealed this part of the appeals court’s decision because it has significant interest in the outcome of the case. The PCA has appealed other parts of the decision. If on appeal the PCA’s decision is ultimately allowed to stand, it could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard’s Polish customers and on MasterCard’s overall business in Poland. Hungary.    In January 2008, the Hungarian Competition Authority (HCA) notified MasterCard that it had commenced a formal investigation of MasterCard Europe’s (and Visa Europe’s) domestic interchange fees. This followed an informal investigation that the HCA had been conducting since the middle of 2007. On July 12, 2009, the HCA issued to MasterCard a Preliminary Position that MasterCard Europe’s historic domestic interchange fees violate Hungarian competition law. MasterCard responded to the Preliminary Position both in writing and at a hearing which was held on September 8 and 9, 2009. On September 24, 2009, the HCA ruled that MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) historic interchange fees violated the law and fined MasterCard Europe and Visa Europe each approximately $2,600, which was paid during the fourth quarter of 2009. The HCA issued its formal decision on December 2, 2009 and on December 18, 2009, MasterCard appealed the decision to the Hungarian courts. If the HCA’s decision is not reversed on appeal, it could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard’s Hungarian customers and on MasterCard’s overall business in Hungary. Italy.    On July 15, 2009, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) commenced a proceeding against MasterCard and a number of its customers concerning MasterCard Europe’s domestic interchange fees in Italy. MasterCard, as well as each of the banks involved in the proceeding, offered to give certain undertakings to the ICA, which were rejected. If the Italian Competition Authority issues a Statement of Objections to MasterCard in connection with the matter, MasterCard would have the opportunity to respond both in writing and at a hearing and, if a negative decision were reached, to appeal the decision. A negative decision could result in MasterCard and/or its customers being fined and, if not reversed on appeal, could have a significant adverse impact on the revenues of MasterCard’s Italian customers and on MasterCard’s overall business in Italy. New Zealand.    In November 2003, MasterCard assumed responsibility for setting domestic default interchange fees in New Zealand, which previously had been set by MasterCard’s customer financial institutions in New Zealand. In early 2004, the New Zealand Competition Commission (the “NZCC”) commenced an investigation of MasterCard’s domestic interchange fees. MasterCard cooperated with the NZCC in its investigation, made a number of submissions concerning its New Zealand domestic default interchange fees and met with the NZCC on several occasions to discuss its investigation. In November 2006, the NZCC filed a lawsuit alleging that MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) domestic default interchange fees and certain other of MasterCard’s practices, including its “honor all cards” rule, do not comply with New Zealand competition law, and seeking penalties. Several large merchants subsequently filed similar lawsuits seeking damages and injunctive relief. On August 24, 2009, MasterCard entered into a settlement with the NZCC under which, in return for the NZCC terminating the proceeding as against MasterCard, MasterCard agreed to modify and/or clarify some of its rules as they apply to New Zealand. These rule modifications, which were instituted as a result of the settlement, include the fact that MasterCard will set maximum interchange rates for New Zealand transactions and post them on its website, and issuers will be permitted to set their own interchange fees up to the maximum rates, and MasterCard will not prohibit merchants from imposing a surcharge on their customers when they choose to use their MasterCard cards to make purchases in New Zealand, so long as merchants inform customers and any surcharges bear a reasonable relationship to the merchant’s cost of accepting MasterCard cards. In agreeing to the settlement with the NZCC, MasterCard did not admit any wrongdoing or pay any penalties (however, MasterCard did agree to pay half of the NZCC’s legal costs). On October 2, 2009, MasterCard entered into a settlement with the merchant plaintiffs under which, in return for the merchant plaintiffs terminating the proceeding as against MasterCard, MasterCard agreed, among other things and subject to certain conditions, to give the merchants the same commitments as it had given the NZCC, as set forth above. In agreeing to the settlement with the merchant plaintiffs, MasterCard did not admit any wrongdoing or agree to pay any damages (however, MasterCard did agree to pay half of the merchant plaintiffs’ legal costs). Australia.    In 2002, the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) announced regulations under the Payments Systems (Regulation) Act of 1998 applicable to four-party credit card payment systems in Australia, including MasterCard’s. Those regulations, among other things, mandate the use of a formula for determining domestic interchange fees that effectively caps their weighted average at 50 basis points. Operators of three-party systems, such as American Express and Diners Club, were unaffected by the interchange fee regulation. In 2007, the RBA commenced a review of such regulations and, on September 26, 2008, the RBA released its final conclusions. These indicated that the RBA was willing to withdraw its regulations if MasterCard and Visa made certain undertakings regarding the future levels of their respective credit card interchange fees and other practices, including their “honor all cards” rules. If the undertakings were not made, the RBA said it would consider imposing in 2009 additional regulations that could further reduce the domestic interchange fees of MasterCard and Visa in Australia. On August 26, 2009, the RBA announced that it had decided not to withdraw its regulations and that it would maintain them in their current form pending further consideration of the regulations. MasterCard plans to continue discussions with the RBA as to the nature of the undertakings that MasterCard may be willing to provide. The effect of the undertakings or any such additional regulations could put MasterCard at an even greater competitive disadvantage relative to competitors in Australia that purportedly do not operate four-party systems or, in the case of the undertakings, possibly increase MasterCard’s legal exposure under Australian competition laws, which could have a significant adverse impact on MasterCard’s business in Australia. South Africa.    On August 4, 2006, the South Africa Competition Commission created a special body, the Jali Enquiry (the “Enquiry”), to examine competition in the payments industry in South Africa, including interchange fees. After nearly two years of investigation, including several rounds of public hearings in which MasterCard participated, on June 25, 2008, the Enquiry published an Executive Summary of its findings. The Enquiry’s full report was made public on December 12, 2008. The Enquiry recommends, among other things, that an independent authority be established to set payment card interchange fees in South Africa and that payment systems’ (including MasterCard’s) respective “honor all cards” rules be modified to give merchants greater freedom to choose which types of cards to accept. The Enquiry’s report is non-binding but is under active consideration by South African regulators. If adopted, the Enquiry’s recommendations could have a significant adverse impact on MasterCard’s business in South Africa. On October 21, 2008, the South African National Assembly (the “National Assembly”) adopted amendments to that country’s competition laws concerning so-called “complex monopolies” and criminalizing certain violations of those laws (the “South Africa Bill”). On January 29, 2009, the then President of South Africa referred the South Africa Bill back to the National Assembly for further consideration and, in early February 2009, the National Assembly readopted the South Africa Bill. The President also stated that he might submit the South Africa Bill to that country’s Constitutional Court for review. In April 2009, South Africa elected a new President, who signed the South Africa Bill on August 27, 2009 without either referring it to the Constitutional Court or setting a date on which the South Africa Bill will enter into force. If and when the South Africa Bill becomes effective, it could have a significant adverse impact on MasterCard’s business in South Africa. Other Jurisdictions.    In January 2006, a German retailers association filed a complaint with the Federal Cartel Office (“FCO”) in Germany concerning MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) domestic default interchange fees. The complaint alleges that MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) German domestic interchange fees are not transparent to merchants and include so-called “extraneous costs”. On December 21, 2009, the FCO sent MasterCard a questionnaire concerning its domestic interchange fees. In July 2009, the Canadian Competition Bureau informed MasterCard that it intends to review MasterCard’s (and Visa’s) interchange fees and related rules, such as the “honor all cards” and “no surcharge” rules. MasterCard is aware that regulatory authorities and/or central banks in certain other jurisdictions including Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela are reviewing MasterCard’s and/or its members’ interchange fees and/or related practices (such as the “honor all cards” rule) and may seek to regulate the establishment of such fees and/or such practices. </div> Note 21. Legal and Regulatory Proceedings MasterCard is a party to legal and regulatory proceedings with respect to a variety of matters in the ordinary false false Legal Regulatory Proceedings [Text Block] No authoritative reference available. false false 1 1 false UnKnown UnKnown UnKnown false true